January - July 1864
By Andrew Brown
Chapter I
Early in 1864 Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding the Union armies the western states, returned from east Tennessee to Memphis for a winter campaign in central and northern Mississippi.
To concentrate as many men as possible for his expeditions he recalled all the garrisons along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad east of Collierville, making that town of Lafayette (now
Rossville) his railhead. After the evacuation of Corinth in January in accordance with Sherman's orders, and of Pocahontas and Saulsbury, the northern part of Tippah county was automatically
relieved of the almost constant "scouts" that had overrun the country for almost a year and a half. As an illustration of how conditions changed, it is only necessary to record that on January
22 a party of the Seventh Illinois came into Ripley, took away two prisoners, and returned to Saulsbury;1 after this visit no more blue-coated soldiers were seen in the county seat
until May, when Sturgis sent two small detachments into the town during the first of his unsuccessful attempts to catch Forrest.
On February 3 Sherman began his campaign of destruction from Vicksburg to Meridian, which left that part of' the state a smoldering waste. He expected to be joined at Meridan by 7,000 cavalry
under the command of Gen. William Sooy Smith, whom he had ordered to move from Collierville to Pontotoc and Okolona, sweeping up all the forage and subsistence he could and in general doing all
135
The Hoofbeats of Forrrest I
the damage possible in the rich prairie country "but as a general rule respecting homes" on his way to Meridian. But from the beginning Smith had his troubles. Part of his command was slow in
coming up and it was not until February 11 that he get away from Collierville. He then marched through Hudsonville and Holly Springs, crossed Tippah Creek at Becks Ferry in Marshall County and
eventually, on February 16, crossed the Tallahatchie at New Albany. The Journey was a hard one; at Tippah Creek the ferryboat was out of commission and the soldiers were obliged to cross by a
bridge 65 feet long which they improvised from such material as was available. Col. George H. Waring, Jr., one of the brigade commanders, thus described part of the trip: "The first days of our
march in Mississippi were through Tippah County, as rough, hopeless, God-forsaken a country as was ever seen outside of south Mississippi. Its hills were steep, its mud was deep, its houses and
farms were poor, its facilities for the subsistence of a protecting army like ours were of the most meager description, and its streams delayed us long with their torrents of bottomly muddy
water, fast swelling, from the thaw that had unlocked the snow of all the deep buried hills and morasses of their upper waters. We built ferryboats and swamped them, built bridges and broke
them, and slowly and painfully, man by man and horse by horse, transferred the command across the nasty riverbeds. Tippah Creek delayed us and kept us hard at work all day and all night, and we
reached the Tallahatchie at New Albany barely in time to ford the last man across before it rose to impassable heights."2
As Waring's comments on the "God-forsaken country of Tippah County" have been quoted in more than one later work,3 it is perhaps a shame to spoil a good story by pointing out that
Smith's expedition crossed the original Tippah County only at its extreme southwestern corner near Hickory Flat, and did not enter the
136
The Hoofbeats of Forrest I
area occupied by the present county at all. Most of the trials and tribulations which the Colonel described so graphically were visited upon him not in Tippah County, but in Marshall and
Pontotoc.
Smith's army never reached Meridian. After wreaking destruction from Okolona south, to a few miles south of West Point, and in the process encumbering his command with an immense throng of
"contrabands" who eagerly attached themselves to his expedition as a means to get both freedom and something to eat without working for it, he was attacked at Sakatonchee Creek by Forrest. The
Confederates lost little time in gaining the ascendancy and Smith was driven back to Memphis over practically the same route he had taken on the way down, with the exception that the return
trip was made in about half the time occupied by the original journey.
The Sooy Smith foray was the first of five expeditions that Sherman sent out from Memphis against Forrest. After its failure there was a relatively quiet time in north Mississippi and Tippah
County, while Forrest "occupied" west Tennessee and Kentucky, captured Fort Pillow, and generally made himself a thorn in the flesh of Sherman and Hurlbut. From improvised headquarters at
Jackson, Tennessee, he rounded up volunteers, conscripts, forage, cattle, horses, mules and other military necessities, with the intention of moving eastward against Sherman's supply line, the
Nashville ∓mp; Chattanooga Railroad. Late in April, however, he was ordered back to Mississippi, and on May 1 three brigades started south from Jackson toward Purdy, Corinth, and Tupelo,
guarding a long ex-train loaded with supplies of every description. The next day Forrest closed his headquarters at Jackson and moved to Bolivar. In the meantime Sherman had replaced Hurlbut in
the command of the Memphis area with Gen. C. C. Washburn, and had sent Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis to command the cavalry in Washburn's district. He impressed strongly upon these new appointees that
their principal job was to keep Forrest busy and off
137
The Hoofbeats of Forrest I
his lifeline, and from the beginning the new brooms swept clean. Sturgis speedily gathered all the horses that he could find around Memphis and on April 30, with 3,000 cavalry, 3,400 infantry,
and 20 guns marched out of Memphis to trap Forrest before he could get out of west Tennessee. He was hindered, however, by bad roads and by rain and did not reach Somerville until May 3. From
that town he sent Colonel Karge with the Second New Jersey eastward toward Boliver to find out where Forrest was; this unit engaged in a brisk skirmish with Forrest's escort north of Boliver,
after which the Confederates crossed the swollen Hatchie River and destroyed the bridge before the Federals could follow. Karge returned to the main body, and Sturgis, acting probably on his
advice, decided not to continue east where he might have trapped the main body and the all-important supplies, but turned south and followed Forrest himself and the small body of cavalry with
him, which of course was playing into Forrest's hands. Sturgis followed as far as the vicinity of Ripley, which was reached May 6. There he learned that Forrest had passed through two days
before and gave up the chase.
Although Sturgis' reports state that he followed to Ripley, most of his force never actually reached the town but camped a few mile north and west. Orlando Davis, whose diary recounts the
Federal raids on Ripley, records that on May 6 about 75 men of the Fourth Iowa came into town "from the direction of Saulsbury" and remained 20 minutes, capturing one Confederate soldier and a
civilian. Obviously this party was seeking information. On the next day 20 men of the Second New Jersey came in from the same direction but left after thirty minutes.4 The direction
from which the troops came strengthens the belief that Sturgis main force was camped north of town, probably near the intersection of the Saulsbury and Salem-Ruckersville roads.
138
The Hoofbeats of Forrest I
Sturgis reported to Sherman that he would have continued the pursuit of Forrest "had it not been for the utter and entire destitution of the country from Bolivar to Ripley, a distance of forty
miles. . . My horses had scarcely anything to eat, my artillery horses absolutely nothing..."5 Certainly there could hardly be a more poignant comment on the conditions under which
the inhabitants of the "belt of desolation" were forced to live during this period.
Notes on Chapter I
1. Davis, 52
2. Waring, George R., Whip and Spur, (hereinafter cited as Waring), Boston, 1875; pp. 110-111.
3. Among others, in Robert S. Henry's First with the Most Forrest, p.
4. Davis, 53, 54.
5. O. R., Ser. I, Vol XXXII Pt. II, pp. 57, 693, 695-97, 700
139
January - July 1864
By Andrew Brown
Chapter II
After Forrest had organized, outfitted, and trained the men he had brought out of Tennessee he was authorized by Gen. S. D. Lee to cross into middle Tennessee for his long-deferred operations
against the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. But Sherman, anticipating and dreading just such a move, was as usual one step ahead not of Forrest, but of Davis and Bragg, who persistently
underestimated, belittled, and handicapped the great cavalryman. Under Sherman's direction the indefatigable Washburn assembled a force of 3,300 cavalry under the general command of Gen.
Benjamin H. Grierson and the divisional command of Col. George H. Waring, the brigade commanders being Col. Winslow of the Fourth Missouri and Colonel Winslow of the Fourth Iowa; three brigades
of infantry, one of which was a colored brigade under Col. Edward Bouton, under the divisional command of Col. Wm. L. McMillen; 250 wagons, 22 guns, and .supplies for twenty days. This army,
larger by 2,000 than Sherman had considered necessary for its mission, was turned over to Sturgis with instuctions to move from Memphis to Corinth by way of Lamar, Salem, and Ruckersville;
thence down the Mobile and Ohio railroad to Okolona and Columbus, and then, having devastated the rich prairie country and incidentally having disposed of the troublesome Forrest, to sweep
across the state to Grenada and from that town to return to Memphis.6 Sturgis accordingly led his host out of Memphis and on June 1 reached the railhead at Lafayette. Hindered by
continuous, rain and by bad roads and washed-out bridges, the cavalry advanced to about 3 or 4 miles east of Salem, and the infantry to Lamer, by June 3. On the 5th the cavalry had reached the
intersection of the
140
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
Ripley-Lagrange and Salem-Ruckersville roads, about 10 miles northwest of Ripley, while the infantry camped about two miles west of Salem. The next day Colonel Karge with 400 men started to
Rienzi, with instructions to burn the depot, bridges, and trestles in that vicinity before returning to Ripley. He camped that night at the farm of L. B. Yancey, three miles west of Ripley, and
"ruined him" took all him forage and feed - before going on to Renzi by way of the Hatchie Turnpike 7 The rest of the cavalry remained in the vicinity of Ruckersville while the
infantry moved to the intersection of the Ripley-Saulsbury and Salem-Ruckersville roads, where Sturgis made his headquarters at the home of the Widow Childers.8
On the day that Sturgis reached Salem, Forrest was at Russellville, Alabama with 3,200 men and was making preparations to cross the Tennessee River into middle Tennessee. He had left in
Mississippi 1,400 men under Colonel Russell at Tupelo and Corinth, and 1,500 under Colonel Rucker at Oxford. But General Lee, as soon as he learned of the strength and objectives of the Federal
expedition, recalled Forrest from Alabama and sent Rucker into Tippah County to keep an eye on Sturgis.9
On the 7th the entire Sturgis expedition reached Ripley. Colonel Waring, one of the first to enter the town, wrote; "In due time we reached the town of Ripley, a rather pretty New England
looking village, but like all southern towns at that time entirely devoid of men and overflowing with women of the most venomous and spiteful sort who did all in their power to add to the
interest of the evening we passed in their company . . ."10
141
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
Rucker made a feeling-out attack on the Union troops in Ripley, but retired when he had ascertained the strength of the invading force. The Negro soldiers in the command - the first colored
troops seem in Ripley - committed many outrages. They robbed all houses at which there was no guard, killed stock, took corn and meat, and generally got out of hand. They beat one man with a
wagon whip and struck Mrs. Doxey, a sister of Major General Hindman of the Confederate Army. The army remained 24 hours in Ripley; the cavalry camped in Gray bottom on the New Albany road and
about three miles souheast of town on the Fulton road,11 the infantry in and around the town. While Sturgis was in Ripley, Karge returned with the news that the Confederates had few
men and a small amount of stores at Corinth, which thus would be a barren target. On that same day, Sturgis, filled with misgivings, called a Council of war and proposed seriously that the
expedition return to Memphis. He pointed out the continuous rain, the bad roads and broken bridges, the swollen streams; and reflecting the awe which the very name of Forrest already inspired
in the Union armies in the west, wondered if that redoubtable leader might not concentrate an overwhelming force against him near Tupelo, and if he would be able to save his trains and
artillery in case Forrest met and defeated him. Such a spirit of defeatism certainly boded no good to the expedition, but eventually the General was persuaded, it is said largely by Colonel
McMillen, to continue after Forrest. But instead of moving toward Corinth as originally planed, he decided to turn southeast toward Tupelo.12
142
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
He moved down the Fulton road, the cavalry bivouacking about eight miles out near Clear Creek, the infantry camping about three miles from Ripley.13 Before leaving Ripley Sturgis
sent his sick, who numbered between 250 and 400, in 50 wagons back to Memphis.14 One the night of the 9th the entire army camped at Stubbs' farm (Sec. 36-5-4) just north
of the present county line on the Ripley-Pleasant Ridge road. The news was carried almost immediately to Forrest, who had gone to Booneville so that he might be in a position to move toward
either the north or south as circumstances might dictate. But the news that Sturgis was at Stubbs' made it plain that his destination was Tupelo, and Forrest immediately decided to cut him off
before he could get there. He picked as the place of meeting a road junction about ten miles south of Stubbs' where the Ripley-Fulton and Pontotoc-Jacinto roads crossed. At this crossroads were
the church and cemetery of the Bethany Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church, and the home of William Brice, who gave the junction the name by which it is known to every student of military
history - Brice Cross Roads.
Because of the creation of new counties in 1867 and 1870, Brice Cross Roads is now a half mile south of the northern boundary of Lee County, and six and a half miles south of the present south
Tippah County line. At the time of the battle, however, it was in Pontotoc County, about half a mile southeast of the common corner of Tishomingo, Tippah, Pontotoc, and Itawamba Counties. It
was thus only half a mile from the Tippah County line; the bridge over Tishomingo
143
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
Creek which was prominent in the battle was in Tippah County, as was the residence of Dr. Agnew, where Sturgis made his last stand, and the line of retreat through Stubbs Farm and Ripley to
Salem. It is not generally realized that except for the struggle around the cross-roads itself, the battle was fought on Tippah County soil; and the retreat of the Federal army started at the
southeast corner of the county and extended across it to Salem on the western border. In brief, Forrest won his most brilliant victory largely in Tippah County.
Forrest set out from Booneville at 4 AM on June 10 by way of the Pontotoc-Jacinto road with Lyons' and Rucker's brigades, totaling about 1,500 men and two batteries of artillery. He rode as
rapidly as the condition of his horses would permit so as to reach the cross roads before Sturgis. The 500 men at Baldwyn under Johnson also moved toward the battle site, while Bell, with 2,800
men, started from Rienzi with the same objective. The day was hot and sultry. Forrest's plan of battle was simple; he told Rucker, "The cavalry will move out ahead of their infantry and should
reach the cross roads three hours in advance. We can whip their cavalry in that time. As soon as the fight opens they will send back to have the infantry hurried up, and coming at a run for
five or six miles the infantry will be so tired we will run right over them".15 These words, spoken before the first shot had been fired, are a perfect report of the battle; and one
cannot help but notice the insight onto Forrest's own character that the plan gives. While he counted on the exhaustion of the Union soldiers to help him defeat them, he assumed as a matter of
course that his own men, who had in some instances more than twice as far to go to reach the crossroads as did the Federal soldiers, would be fit to fight when they got there. And,
characteristically, they were.
144
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
Sturgis' cavalry left Stubbs' farm at 5.30, his infantry at 7.00 AM on the 10th. The advanced guard, after some skirmishing with Confederate outpost in the bottom of Tishomingo and Dry Creeks,
reached and passed the cross roads about 10.00 jM. The remainder of the cavalry followed and formed a line of battle about a mile east of the Junction, where they were confronted by Forrest's
main body. For the first hour of the fighting the Confederate leader had less than 1,000 men with him, but by taking advantage of the blackjack thickets and of every other protection the
terrain offered he held the Union troops in check until reinforcements arrived, attacking with increasing fury all the while. Before 1.00 o'clock, just as he had predicted, the Federal cavalry
was so completely exhausted that Grierson asked that they be relieved by infantry. Again as Forrest had foreseen, the infantry had been brought up at the double-quick on the hot, steamy day,
and were in no condition to withstand the continuous Confederate onslaughts. Moreover the long train - Sturgis' line of march from Stubbs' was five miles long - slowed the movements of the
fighting men, and the situation became much worse after the infantry and part of the train had crossed Tishomingo Creek and the train had been ordered into park. Some one decided that the army
was not making much progress ahead - a distinct understatement - and ordered the train turned in case it became necessary to go back. While the turning - never an easy job in such densely
weeded country - was in progress the Union lines around the cross roads broke and cavalry and infantry began to drift back toward the bridge, closely pursued by the Confederate artillery which
began to drop shells into the parked vehicles and the bridge. And to add to the confusion, while this was going on - the time was now about 5.00 o'clock - Colonel Barteau's Second Tennessee
Regiment stormed down the road from Old Carrollton to the Agnew place,16 three miles north of the cross roads, and struck the already demoralized Yankee in the rear. Barteau had only
145
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
250 men, but by having his bugler gallop up and down the lines, blowing from widely separated points, he convinced the Union troops that they were faced not by one small regiment but by several
large ones. Barteau's charge gave the coup de grace to Federal resistance; within a short time Sturgis was leading his men in a hurried retreat back to Stubbs' farm and Ripley, while Forrest
went to work to save the captured wagons, some of which the Federals had attempted to burn. By the time that little matter had been attended to satisfactorily darkness had fallen. Forrest threw
out an advance to follow slowly and cautiously after the enemy, while the rest of his command halted to feed and rest.14 They needed it; they had marched 18 to 25 miles since dawn,
had fought from five to seven hours, and had pursued the conquered for four or five miles beyond the cross roads. Unstilted tribute must be paid to the fortitude of men who could stand up under
such a grueling pace, no less than to the genius of the great soldier who led and inspired them.
After the tide of battle turned to the west the home of Dr. Brice, which Sturgis had used as headquarters, was made a hospital for wounded Confederates, as was nearby Bethany church. Three
miles north the Agnew home still stood despite the intense fighting around it. In describing the battle thirty years later, Rev. Samuel Agnew, the son of Dr. Agnew described how he had been
away from home looking after the stock, which was always hidden in case of Federal invasion, and his impressions upon his return home after the fighting was over: "The fence around the garden
and yard had been torn down. Many horses were hitched under every tree in the yard. Soldiers were stalking through the yard and house without ceremony. The public road was lined with wagons in
both directions as far as could be seen. As I came home, for more than half a mile I saw hundreds of articles of every description which had been thrown away by the Yankees in their retreat.
The road was filled with
146
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
soldiers passing to and fro. Several dead negroes in blue uniform were lying in the road . . . I found females of the family all on the back piazza . . . They told me that the Yankees had taken
every grain of corn and every ounce of wheat, leaving us nothing to eat; that they had not had a bite to eat since the previous morning and that the house had been plundered. I walked through
the rooms and found everything turned upside down and many things had been taken from us. Bullets had penetrated the walls of the house in various places. Negroes and white men had both
plundered our dwelling. Nothing could move their pity, but with vandal hands they rifled trunks and bureaus. They entered every room. Destruction seemed to be their aim. They even entered the
negro cabins and robbed them of their clothing. As they went down they cut the ropes and let the bucket down into the well. As they went back, panting with heat and suffering from exhaustion,
they were glad to drink such dirty slop as they could find. The negro troops were especially insolent. As they passed down they would shake their fists at the ladies and say that they were
going to show Forrest that they were his rulers. As they returned their tune changed. With tears in their eyes some of them came to my mother and asked what they should do? Would Mr. Forrest
kill them? . .
"The final stand was made at my father's house. when the fight began my mother, wife, and sisters closed all the shutters, went into an inner room and lying flat on the floor awaited the issue
of the conflict. Two Federal soldiers came upon the back piazza and surrendered to my mother just before the fight began. The yard was the battleground. Southern troops were on the south side,
northern troops on the north side. They made a breastwork of a picket fence on that side. A Federal battery was in front of our gate, and Rice's battery, (Confederate) was just below the bend
of the public road . . ."18
Many of the negro soldiers in Bouton's brigade were killed in the battle. They wore "Remember Fort Pillow" badges, and were said to carry black flags and to have sworn before they left Memphis
that they would not give quarter. Their very presence in uniform infuriated the Southerners, and their insolent behavior made matters worse. The Confederates shot them down relentlessly, and it
is likely that more negroes lost their lives in the Brice Cross Roads campaign than fell
147
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
in the "massacre" at Fort Pillow, which is now recognized to have been part misunderstanding, part over enthusiasm on the part of a few trigger-happy soldiers, and mostly Union propaganda.
More rain fell on the night of the 10th, further handicapping the flight of the Union forces. About 1 AM the 11th Forrest's cavalry, after their brief rest, again put pressure on the retreating
bluecoats. About 3 o'clock they came upon the rear guard in the Hatchie River bottom, about one and a half miles south of Stubbs' Farm. About 200 feet of the road across the bottom was very
bad; and in this deep mud, with rain pelting them, much of the artillery and wagons that had hitherto escaped capture were bogged down.19 The pursuit continued to Ripley, no
resistance being offered except for a short time at the crossing of the West Hatchie about five miles from town, where the Union troops tore down Wiers Chapel to help corduroy the muddy road
across the bottom.20 At 4 AM the advance guard of the Federals reached Ripley, with Sturgis himself in front. At dawn Waring noticed Sturgis and McMillen "siting under a tree in the
middle of town"; they made some slight effort to organize a holding action. But before they could regroup their flying soldiers they were attacked, about 8 AM, by Forrest's men and fighting
raged in and around the town for about two hours.
148
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
The Confederate attack split the infantry in two parts and one escaped via the Saulsbury road, the other via the Salem Road.20A The Yankees were thoroughly defeated and scattered in
every direction through the woods. They abandoned the last of their artillery, and two ambulances, in Miller's field north of town (now in north Ripley). More than twenty Union soldiers killed
in the battle were buried in the town and about 100 wounded left behind. The treatment of these wounded brought the amende honorable from Col. Waring, who on his way out had commented on
the "venomous and spiteful" women of the town. He wrote: "The ambulances with our groaning wounded men came pouring into the village, and to our surprise those women who had so recently given
only evidence of a baleful hatred, pressed around to offer every aid that lay in their power, and to comfort suffering men as only kind-hearted women can . . ." 21
By noon of June 11 Ripley was clear of all Federal troops except the dead and the wounded, while the army that had marched so bravely out of Memphis to conquer Forrest was an army no longer,
but a panic-stricken mob struggling in any way it could to get back to Collierville and reinforcements. In the rugged country between Ripley and Salem small parties of Confederates harassed the
fugitives constantly, capturing small parties in the weeds and generally adding to the confusion. Forrest followed as far as his old home at Salem, where he spent the night at the home of Orrin
Beck, his mother's brother.22 As by this time there were only a few frightened stragglers left within reach, he recalled his men and returned to Tupelo to recuperate and refit.
149
The Hoofbeats of Forrest II
When Sturgis returned to Memphis and counted the cost of his attempt to "get Forrest's hair" he was forced to report a loss of 2,240 men, of whom 223 were killed, 394 wounded, and 1,623
missing. A disproportionate number of the killed and wounded were in Bouton's brigade. Forrest had 96 killed and 396 wounded, which shows that the Federal troops made a fight of it until their
line around the crossroads was broken. The Confederates lost not a man, a horse, a gun, or a wagon by capture; on the other hand they took 60 officers and 1,558 enlisted men, 16 guns, 1,500
stand of small arms, 300,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 176 wagons, mostly six-horse, and immense quantities of other equipment and supplies. Among the booty were five ambulances, which
were filled with captured medical supplies and hurried to General Johnston's army in Georgia, which was in desperate need of them.23
The battle of Brice Cross Roads or Tishomingo Creek as it is called in some Confederate reports, was Forrest's greatest battle. Never during the War Between the States, and seldom during the
long history of warfare, has an army of inferior strength defeated so decisively one of superior force. In another respect, also, the fight is memorable; it is one of the few Battles of all
time after which the victor was able to maintain the pursuit until the enemy ceased to exist as an armed force. It is small wonder that military men the world over recognize Forrest's conduct
of the battle as a masterpiece of planning, timing, and execution. Notes on Chapter II
6. O. R., Ser. I, Vol XXXIX, Pt. I, p. 219
7. Southern Sentinel, March 28, 1895
8. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 87-90
9. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II (78) pp. 750-751; Vol. Pt. pp. 221, 222.
10. Waring, p. 128
11. Davis, 56: Scott, W. F., The Story of a Cavalry Regiment (4th Iowa), New York 1893, pp. 233-234.
12. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. I , pp. 91, 162, 200, 207.
13. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. I, pp. 77, 91, 162, 200, 207.
14. Davis, 56; Scott, p. 235
15. Wyeth, J. A., Life of General N. B. Forrest, New York, 1899, p. 400
16. Sec. 27-6-5
17. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. I, p. 224
18. Southern Sentinel, March 28, 1895; reprinted June 13 and 20 and 27, and July 4 and 11, 1935.
19. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. I, p. 224
20. The U. S. Government later reimbursed the church for the value of the building.
20A. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. I, p. 106
21. Waring, pp. 131-132
22. Henry, R. S., First with the Most Forrest, p. 514, quoting an interview with a member of Forrest's escort.
23. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. I, pp. 95, 226-228, 230-231: Mathes, J. H., Bedford Forrest (in Great Commanders series) New York, 1902, p. 249.
150
January - July 1864
By Andrew Brown
Chapter III
Forrest did not delude himself into thinking that his smashing victory over Sturgis would give him more than a brief respite from Federal attack. He knew that as soon as the men could be
assembled the implacable Sherman would send out another army to keep him occupied; the Union commander could never forget for a moment the damage that Forrest could do to his vital railroad
supply line in Tennessee, which he wanted to attack, which the best military minds of the Confederacy insisted that he should attack; but from which he was held off by the blind stupidity of
Bragg and Davis. As anyone who knew Sherman could have foretold, no sooner had that pugnacious redhead learned of the debacle at Brice Cross Roads than he diverted to Memphis. 14,000 men under
Gen. A. J. Smith that had been intended for an expedition against Mobile. He wrote the Secretary of War that he would order Smith and General Mower to "go out and follow Forrest to the death if
it costs 10,000 lives and breaks the Federal treasury", adding "There will never be peace in Tennessee until Forrest is dead".24 On June 16 he wrote his second in command, General
McPherson: ". . . We will not attempt the Mobile trip now, but I wish you to arrange as large a force as possible at Memphis to pursue Forrest on foot, devastating the land over which he has
past or may pass, and make him and the people of Tennessee and Mississippi realize that though a bold, daring and successful leader, he will bring ruin on any country in which he may pause or
tarry. If we do not punish Forrest and the people now the whole effect of our past conquests will be lost . . ."25
151
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
No stronger evidence of Sherman's preoccupation with Forrest and his determination to keep him off his supply lines can be imagined than his order to devastate the country over which Forrest
passed. As for his fear that Forrest would move into Tennessee, there is no better proof of his determination to thwart such a movement than his order to Gen. William Sooy Smith, then in
command of the cavalry at Nashville. Smith was told that if Forrest crossed the Tennessee River in the vicinity of Muscle Shoals the towns of Florence and Tuscumbia were to be burned and the
inhabitants moved north to the Ohio River.26 In short, Sherman knew what Bragg and Davis were never willing to learn: that if Forrest were permitted to move into Tennessee and cut
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad Sherman's Georgia campaign would be in deadly peril. And Sherman would stop at nothing to keep that line open.
On June 22 General Washburn at Memphis wrote Sherman that Forrest was at Baldwyn and Tupelo "with a large force"; that Gen. A. J. Smith with 9,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and four batteries
planned to move along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad toward Corinth" so as to draw Forrest as far north as possible and whip him".27 On the same day Smith moved to Lafayette, at
that time the end of the railroad and began to repair the line. He reached Lagrange on the 27th and Saulsbury on the 28th. Apparently he intended to continue the repair work to Corinth, but
found that the road had been so thoroughly destroyed east of Saulsbury that rebuilding it was impracticable.
152
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
While Smith was hesitating at his Saulsbury railhead Forrest sent 400 men under his brother Col. Jesse Forrest to the vicinity of Ripley to watch developments, reporting to Lee that he "would
move a greater force there except for the difficulty of supplying it with forage" - another of the myriad evidence of the destitution of north Mississippi.29 On July 2 Jesse
Forrest's regiment was augmented by the First Mississippi Partisan Rangers under Lieutenant Colonel Hyams; as the organization was composed almost entirely of Tippah County men, they would be
most useful as pickets and scouts. Forrest's order sending the Rangers to Ripley is typical of the through planning that characterized his every move. He ordered the regiment to carry three
days cooked rations, two days' rations of corn on their horses, and 40 rounds of ammunition in their cartridge boxes. Three day's rations, four day's corn, and 40 additional rounds of
ammunition were to be sent to Ripley in wagons, after which the supplies were to be stored in Ripley and the wagons returned. Both the regiment and the supplies were to move at
night.30
Upon their arrival at Ripley the Rangers picketed the Salem road. In the meantime, on July 2, Washburn sent Brigadier General Hatch, who as Colonel of the Second Iowa had participated in the
first "capture" of Ripley and in many subsequent raids into Tippah County, to Smith as a sort of super-guide. At the same time Washburn advised Smith to go by way of Ripley to Pontotoc, where
there was plenty of forage, and from Pontotoc to Okolona and Columbus. He also told Smith that Tupelo was a strong point and "to make Forrest come out of it.31 Then
153
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
followed the usual instructions to live off the prairie country around Okolona, Aberdeen, and Columbus.
On July 5 Smith, apparently disturbed by reports of the condition of the roads south of Ripley asked Washburn for permission to move toward the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in the vicinity of
Rienzi and then turn northeast toward Tuscumbia, Alabama, with the idea of drawing Forrest into that area.32 Apparently Hatch talked him out of that scheme, for on the same day his
cavalry under Grierson started down the Saulsbury-Ripley road, marching with great caution and keeping skirmishers ahead and on both flanks of the main body to avoid the possibility of
surprise. West of the cavalry and protected by it from any sudden Confederate incursion the infantry started from Davis Mills, about six miles south of Lagrange and from Grand Junction, and
marched to Salem, then swung east over the old "upper Ripley and Salem" road toward Ripley. They were joined by the cavalry about 6 miles from Ripley, in all probability near Antioch Church,
from which a road led northeast to the Saulsbury road.
Both the cavalry and infantry were watched closely by the Confederates and there was some small-scale skirmishing during the advance. A vidette of the Partisan Rangers under Lt. V. A. Grace
went as far west as the residence of James McDonald, where Ashland now stands. The videttes sat their horses all night within sight and hearing of the enemy and the next morning fell back
slowly before the Federal advance and joined the main body on the east bank of a tributary of Tippah Creek then known as Whitten Branch, but shown on recent maps as Medlock's branch. The
Rangers' position was on the crest of a high,
154
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
steep "soapstone" hill, where they were in a position to watch both the Holly Springs and Salem roads. They withheld their fire until the Federal advance guard was crossing the stream and then
poured in a volley that sent the Union cavalrymen to the rear in confusion. They rallied when out of range, however, and send a skirmish line forward which drove Hyams and his men back after
about two hours of fighting. The Rangers then left a strong picket to watch the Federals and withdrew their main body through the town of Ripley and formed a line south of the corporate limits,
probably south of King Creek on the hill now know as the Gaillard hill.33 On that night the Union army camped about three miles from Ripley, part of it doubtless on the same hill
Hyams had defended. From this camp, for the second time since his expedition left Memphis, Smith issued strict orders against straggling.34
Although he could not of course say so, he realized that stragglers in that region were likely to be attacked by either Forrest's men or by out-and-out guerrillas, and like every Union
commander who faced Forrest, he convinced himself that the Confederate force was much stronger than it actually was. There is also reason to believe that Smith was fearful of his negro troops,
who had been such liabilities on the Sturgis expedition; and for political reasons it was necessary that the dusky regiments be kept in line, and that they should make as good an impression as
possible.
155
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
On the morning of the 8th Smith passed through Ripley. The march-through is best described by Davis: "At 7 AM the Federal army commenced arriving and were until 3 PM passing through Ripley. The
scenes of this visitation were the most terrible of any that we have ever experienced in Ripley. The Yankees were infuriated because of their former defeat here and came in swearing vengeance
on the town. 35 stores, dwellings, and churches, including the courthouse, were burned, the south side of the square was fired by the cavalry in the morning, the north side by the negroes in
the evening (afternoon). Mrs. Prince's, Col. Falkner's, and Mr. Ford's dwellings were burned. The Courthouse, Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Methodist Church, and Female Academy shared the
same fate. My own dwelling was saved by the exertions of a guard left by Colonel McMillen."35
It is clear that Smith's men took Sherman's orders to devastate the country over which Forrest had passed literally, and in Ripley at least they burned practically all the public and business
buildings. Strangely enough, in their wholesale orgy of destruction they as a rule spared private dwellings; the burning of the three residences listed by Davis can be explained by their
proximity to public buildings. Colonel Falkner's residence, for example, was west of the Methodist church in the same block;36 the Prince place was across the street from the same
church, and Mr. Ford's residence was across the street from the Cumberland Presbyterian Church. There are persistent rumors that a high wind was blowing at the time, which would further explain
the dwelling house fires. It is also said that the roof of the tavern on the site of the present Freeman hotel caught fire but was extinguished before serious damage was done. Davis' mention
that his own home
156
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
was saved by a guard left by Col. McMillen may reflect his statue as a marked man because he had signed the Ordinance of Secession; on the other hand, as none of the other residences on Jackson
Street were fired, Davis may have exaggerated his danger.
The burning of the two churches is hard to explain satisfactorily. It is possible that the Cumberland Presbyterian Church may have caught from the stores on the south side of the square, as it
was just south of them; but the burning of the Methodist Church and the Masonic Hall, which occupied the second floor of the church building, was undoubtedly deliberate.37
From Ripley Smith took the Pontotoc road past the ruins of Orizaba to New Albany, where he crossed the Tallahatchie on July 9.38 He then went to Pontotoc, with the intention of
moving southeast toward Okolona; but learning that Forrest was moving toward Tupelo, he forgot Washburn's advice to "make Forrest come out of Tupelo" and advanced toward the town. On the 14th
he met Forrest at the battle of Harrisburg, fought in what is now west Tupelo. Technically the battle was a Federal victory, but it was one of those encounters the outcome of which was not
satisfactory to either side. After waiting through the 15th to see if Forrest would again attack, Smith began his return to Memphis without "Forrest's hair", which he had been ordered to get at
all costs, but, as he persistently and somewhat
157
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
pridefully reported, he at least brought back everything in the way of property that he took out. The official explanation for his withdrawal was that the hard bread he had drawn was moldy and
that he was therefore short of subsistence - this on the edge of the rich prairie country! It is impossible not to surmise that the real reason probably was that despite the fact that he had
defeated Forrest in battle - something no other Federal commander had done - he wanted no more of him and was glad to get out of his reach. Leaving Harrisburg on the 16th, he camped that night
at Ellistown in northeastern Pontotoc County, the next night near New Albany, and then turned north and crossed the Tippah probably near the Matthews Mill crossing on the 18th. On the 19th he
went to Salem and on the 20th reached the railroad and returned to Memphis. Apparently he did not keep Washburn any too well posted as to where he was, for on the 18th about 60 men
of the 12th Missouri came to Ripley on the Saulsbury road to inquire after him.39
General Smith reached Memphis on July 23 and immediately set about gathering another army to go after Forrest. This time he built up a force of 18,000 men, with which he traveled along the
repaired Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Grand Junction, thence down the Mississippi Central to Holly Springs. On August 8 he started south again and crossed the Tallahatchie at Abbeville.
After being stalled south of the river for about a week by unusually heavy rains, he continued his march to Oxford, which the last of his units entered on the 21st. On that same day the
ever-resourceful Forrest, realizing that he could not hope to grapple with Smith's forces in the field, turned to daring stratagem and staged his famous raid on Memphis which came within an ace
of capturing two Major Generals and did result in the confiscation of General Washburn's pants, which
158
The Hoofbeats of Forrest III
Forrest courteously returned under a flag of truce. The panic resulting from Forrest's raid recalled Smith to Memphis in a hurry, and again north Mississippi was temporarily saved. Before the
excitement had died down, however, Sherman captured Atlanta and at long last the Richmond authorities did what they should have done months before - they sent Forrest against Sherman's
communications in Tennessee. His campaign in that state, though a tactical success, came too late to have any effect on the outcome of the war. He never again set foot in Tippah County, where
he had grown to manhood; but singularly enough the last visit of Federal troops to Ripley, in March 1865, was made in a vain effort to capture a body of troops on their way from Tennessee to
join Forrest at Tupelo.
Notes on Chapter III
24. O. R., Ser I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. II, p. 474
25. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, p. 123
26. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. II, p. 474
27. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, p. 139
28. Same, p. 149
29. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, p. 666
30. Same, p. 681
31. Same, p. 162.
32. Same, p. 165.
33. Southern Sentinel, July 5, 1894. This article, entitled "The Battle of Whitten Branch" was written from an account by a survivor, W. M. Horton. See also O. R., Ser. I, Vol.
XXXIX, Pt. I, p. 250.
34. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, p. 168
35. Davis, 58
36. This property is now owned by the railroad. The block on which the postoff ice now stands, known for years as the Falkner place, was owned during the war by R. J. Thurmond and was
purchased from him by Falkner after the war.
37. Personal communication, Thos. E. Pegram, April 3, 1954. In an effort to recover damages to the church property from the Federal Government (which had paid for the Wier's Chapel building as
noted above, note on p. ) Pegram obtained a statement from Sallie Hughey, a young girl at the time, that she saw the building set on fire. The statement has been lost but its authenticity may
be accepted. The government did not pay, on the ground that the building was not used for the advantage of the army.
38. O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, p. 178
39. Davis, 59
159
January - July 1864
By Andrew Brown
Chapter IV
Not only was every military movement in Tippah County during the first seven months of 1864 dictated by the actions of General Forrest, but the strictly internal affairs of the county also bore
the imprint of his forceful personality. On January 13, following his raid into Tennessee during December, the scope of "Forrest's Cavalry Command" was enlarged to include western Tennessee and
Kentucky and all of Mississippi north of a line drawn across the state just north of Columbus, Grenada, and Cleveland.1 He immediately turned his furious energy into bringing order
into his district, much of which had been for a year and a half a no-man's land in which the only law was that of the pistol and the sword. Forrest's cleanup was assisted by Sherman's action in
removing the garrisons along the Memphis and Charleston east of Collierville; this permitted the Confederates to operate more freely in north Mississippi and especially in Tippah County than
had been possible in the period when a raid from Saulsbury or Pocahontas might be expected at almost any time. With the garrisons along the railroad removed, Forrest had only to watch for
expeditions out of Memphis, and such was his scouting system that he invariably knew about these forays in plenty of time to take steps to meet them.
Forrest showed no particular interest in trying to break up the trade with Memphis. He himself had obtained many things of military value by way of that city and took a tolerant attitude toward
the whole trading question. He was helped by the fact that General Johnston, who had insisted on enforcement of the trading-with-the-enemy act to the last jot and tittle, had been sent to
Georgia to succeed Forrest's old nemesis Bragg; and General Polk, who succeeded Johnston, viewed the
160
The Hoofbeats of Forrest IV
trade in a rather lenient light. Spared the hounding to which Chalmers had been subjected, Forrest devoted his attention to rounding up the hundreds of deserters, conscription evaders and
outlaws in his district, in the process introducing law and order into a region from which they had long been absent. His action in sending the First Partisan Rangers from Okolona to Corinth by
rail, with orders to "breast the country" from Corinth through Ripley to Holly Springs, rounding up deserters and particularly arresting or driving out of the country the men who had been
impressing horses without authority.2 was typical of his methods. He had by this time gained a formidable reputation not only among the Union troops, but also among the lawless
element that had been living off the country; and the very fact that he was in charge of the district, and likely to sweep down on them at any time, made even the most troublesome refugees
think twice before taking undue liberties.
Results of Forrest's arrival in the district began to show as early as December 1863, when the Tippah County Board of Police held its first meeting since March. Thereafter every meeting, except
that for June, was held until the courthouse was burned in July. The January 1864 meeting was held at the home of Mr. John Jernigan, that for February at the home of a Mr. Tilghman; the other
meetings were held at the courthouse. By March 1864 the Board was beginning to function again, and its most serious problems was that of military relief, which had taken up so much of its time
in 1861 and early 1862 but which of necessity had lapsed since. At the March meeting, under authority of the State belief acts, the board passed an order which reads, "The regular commissioners
of the relief committee having reported to the Board of Police that they are unable to purchase at reasonable and just prices
161
The Hoofbeats of Forrest IV
such supplies and provisions as are needed in the county for the families and lawful dependents of soldiers in the service; it is therefore ordered that a writ issue to the sheriff of the
county authorizing and directing him to make impressment of such supplies and provisions as may be absolutely necessary, in the manner required by Law".3 At the same meeting the
Board authorized the clerk to keep the minutes of the meetings on loose paper until such time as he could transcribe them to the regular book, which was hidden near Dumas with the other county
records.
The records of the Board of Police, and such other records of the period as have been preserved, show plainly that although conditions could not have been called good by any means - the utter
destitution of the country is remarked on in many of the reports - the civil government was beginning to function and on the whole the state of affairs was far better than it had been during
1863.
Some time in 1864 the Conscription Bureau entered Tippah County; there are records as early as April of men "detailed" - this being the Civil War equivalent of "exempted". But for the first
half of the year the Bureau played a low second fiddle to Forrest, who was his own Bureau and a most effective one. His record brought a considerable number of volunteers to him, and he was
ruthless in rounding up conscripts and deserters. One of the many facets of Forrest's character that is not generally known or appreciated is his ability to make good soldiers out of apparently
hopeless material. A large percentage of the men he brought out of Tennessee and Kentucky, and many of these who joined him in Mississippi, were not volunteers but conscripts who had for all
practical purposes been shanghaied into the army. Yet, in these awkward, inexperienced, and in many cases
162
The Hoofbeats of Forrest IV
unwilling soldiers the "Lt. Genl. commanding" built an esprit de corps that was the marvel of other commanders, Union and Confederate, and of soldiers of later days as well.
No study of conditions in north Mississippi in 1863 and 1864 can avoid a comparison of Chalmers and Forrest as district commanders. Admittedly Chalmers was no Forrest; there was but one of that
breed. But in fairness to Chalmers it must be said that during most of his tenure of command he received practically no help from his superiors, who had their hands more than full around
Vicksburg. After Lee was placed in command of the Mississippi cavalry in August Chalmers was given more leeway and much assistance as Lee could render, and on the record did a satisfactory job
under most trying conditions, not the least onerous of which was Johnston's obsession with the trading-with-the-enemy act. In short, Chalmers did about as well as anyone, except possibly such a
genius as Forrest, could have done under such conditions. This was recognized by both Lee and Forrest; for after Forrest's cavalry command was set up Chalmers was placed in charge of the First
Brigade and except for one brief period, served as Forrest's second-in-command throughout the rest of the war and remained his close friend until death. It is possible and even probable that
his initial appointment was due to Lee; but his retaining of his post for a year and a half is a tribute to Chalmers' own ability and devotion. Forrest was not one to carry deadheads.
By the end of 1863 very few new military organizations were being formed in the Confederate States, though there was an increasing tendency for existing organizations to be transferred from
State to Confederate service. Vacancies in the ranks were in general filled, if they were filled at all, by conscripts, and a trend toward consolidation of small commands was noted. So far as
the record shows, the last company to be raised as a unit in
163
The Hoofbeats of Forrest IV
Tippah County was organized by W. T. Stricklin - the same Stricklin who had been Adjutant of the 23rd Mississippi and who had sent Chalmers word of the first Federal raid on Ripley. Stricklin,
always an enthusiast, decided to raise a company to act as bodyguard to his friend and fellow attorney, General Chalmers. Late in 1863 he managed to enlist about 60 men, about half of whom
could be depended on to be present. Among that half was Richard J. Thurmond, who had served with Sol Street on at least one occasion before joining Stricklin's company in December 1863. On May
2, 1864 Stricklin's company was combined with Company E of Lt. Col. Thomas C. Ashcraft's Third Battalion of State Cavalry, the reorganization taking place in northern Itawamba (now Lee).
Thurmond was elected captain of the combined company; and on June 16 at Tupelo, the company was transferred to Confederate service as Company A of Ashcraft's regiment of cavalry, sometimes
known as the Eleventh Mississippi cavalry. The one extant muster roll of the company, dated July 8, shows an aggregate enrollment of 86; present 39, absent without leave, 22.4 This
percentage of absentees without leave seems to have been about normal for the period.
Ashcraft's regiment, which contained a number of Tippah County men in its various companies besides those in Company A, went to Georgia in July 1864 and fought dismounted in the battles around
Atlanta. It was later mounted and participated in Hood's ill-fated Tennessee campaign, and its last action was during the defense of Selma, Alabama, under Forrest, just before the surrender in
May 1865.
Notes on Chapter IV
1. O. R., Ser I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. II, p. 528
2. O. R., Ser I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. II, pp. 616 - 617
3. Police Minutes, p.
4. A. G. O., Service record R. J. Thurmond; C. M. R. Muster payrolls Ashcraft' s regiment
164
Genealogy and Civil War Links
